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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CHANNON S. SINGH,

:

Petitioner/Appellant,
v.

:
:

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.

:
:

Supreme Court
Case No.
Court of Appeals
Case No. 900497-CA
Priority No. 13

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Does the forgery statute incorporate the elements of
"legal efficacy" or completeness into its provisions?

(Does an

incomplete and facially invalid driver's permit constitute a
"writing" for purposes of the forgery statute?)
Did the lower court err in forcing the jury to choose
between a forgery conviction or a complete acquittal when the
forgery charge may not have been applicable and Petitioner's other
requested instructions were more specifically tailored for the
involved conduct?

(Should Petitioner have been allowed to instruct

the jury on attempted forgery, prohibited use of a license, and
theft by receiving stolen property?)
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The court of appeals' decision, State v. Singh. 171 Utah
Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App. 1991), is attached to this petition as
Appendix 1.

JURISDICTION
On October 15, 1991, the court of appeals issued State v.
Sinah, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App. 1991).

See Appendix 1.

Petitioner Singh filed this petition within the designated 30 day
time period and pursuant to the applicable rules. Utah R. App.
P. 48(a); Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991); Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1991) ("The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review
of a Court of Appeals adjudication, . . . " ) ; see also Utah R. App.
P. 49(a)(6) (D).
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutory provisions
and rules are contained in Appendix 2:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code Ann. §
Code Ann. §
Code Ann. §
Code Ann. §
Code Ann. §
Code Ann. §
Code Ann. §
Code Ann. §
Code Ann. §
Code Ann. §
Code Ann. §
Code Ann. §
Code Ann. §
Code Ann. §
Code Ann. §
R. App. 4 6
R. App. 4 8
R. App. 49

41-2-102(13)
41-2-133(1)
41-2-404(1)
70A-1-201(5)
70A-3-104(l)(a)
70A-3-lll(c)
70A-3-401(l)
76-1-402
76-4-101
76-4-102
76-6-408
76-6-501
76-8-1001
76-8-1002
78-2-2
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 11, 1990, following a two day trial,1 a jury
convicted Channon S. Singh of five counts of forgery, all second
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-501(3)(a)
(1990), with one count enhanced pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-8-1001, -1002 (1990) (habitual criminal), in the Third
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, presiding.

On August 10, 1990, Judge

Moffat sentenced Mr. Singh to an indeterminate term of five years to
life for Count I, the habitual criminal charge.

Transcript of

Sentencing Proceeding,2 dated August 10, 1990 [hereinafter MSTfl]
at 6.

The court also imposed four other indeterminate terms of one

to fifteen years: one term ran concurrently with the habitual
criminal sentence, the remaining three ran consecutively.
at 6-7). A $500.00 restitution order was also imposed.

(ST
(ST at 7).

1

Prior to trial, Mr. Singh moved to quash the bindover
to circuit court, alleging that there was insufficient evidence for
trial. (R 22-26). He later moved to dismiss the Information for
reasons similar to those stated in his motion to quash (the evidence
revealed at the preliminary hearing would not satisfy each element
of forgery). (R 31-38). Mr. Singh renewed his motion before trial,
(T 2-18), and again, following the State's case-in-chief. (T 81;
110-18). The court rejected these motions and his exceptions to the
jury instructions. See State v. Singh, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah
App. 1991).
2

The record cite, (R 159), is one bound document
containing three separate transcripts: (1) the two day trial
proceeding began on July 10, 1990; (2) followed by the March 30,
1990, motion to quash proceeding; (3) and ending with the August 10,
1990, sentencing proceeding.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Singh agrees with the statement of facts set forth in
the court of appeals opinion.
at 39-40 (Utah App. 1991).

See Singh, 171 Utah Adv. Rep.

In brief, Channon Singh sold undercover

officers temporary driver's permits which "bore an examination test
score, an expiration date, and signatures purporting to be those of
an examiner and the director of the Driver License Division for the
Department of Public Safety.

The permits remained blank as to the

name, height, weight, sex, eye color, and date of birth of the
holder."

171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39-40.

In addition, when an officer

asked Singh "how to fill out the missing information on the
permits," Singh instructed the officer and thereafter boasted about
its usefulness.

See id. at 40. The officers only observed Singh

mark on one of the permits; they did not know whether Singh had
marked the other permits.

(T 68); Appellant's opening brief at 3,

7 n.2; Appellee's brief at 4.
Also undisputed factually was the testimony of the
involved officers who conceded that the incomplete licenses, in the
form as sold to them, were invalid and could not be used.

See

(R 32); (T 68, 79); Appellant's opening brief at 3, 9; Appellee's
brief at 5, 19; Appellant's reply brief at 5, 6, 7.

The Singh

opinion omitted this important fact, however, and similarly failed
to acknowledge the notation on the involved licenses which read,
"Not Valid Without Licensee's Signature."
Appendix 3.

4

-

See State's Exhibits 1-3;

ARGUMENT
POINT I
"LEGAL EFFICACY" OR THE REQUIREMENT OF APPARENT
COMPLETENESS IS REQUIRED BY THE FORGERY STATUTE
In State v. Singh, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App.
1991), the court first considered whether the forgery statute, Utah
Code Ann. "section 76-6-501[,] incorporate[d] elements of legal
efficacy and completeness."

Id. at 40. This question of statutory

construction was reviewed for correctness, with no particular
deference afforded the trial court's decision.

Id.

"Legal efficacy," a term originating in common law,
requires that the involved instrument be complete enough to evidence
a legally enforceable right.3

See (R 32-34); Appellant's opening

brief, Point I; State v. Ortega, 418 N.W.2d 57 (Iowa 1988) ("blank
computer printed forms [driver's licenses], having no legal
efficacy, are void on their face [as they] evidence no legally
enforceable right and therefore have no capacity to deceive anyone
concerning rights or liabilities affected by government").

Utah's

Code may not expressly list legal efficacy in its forgery statute,4

3

Petitioner Singh does not contend that in order to be
"complete," every "i" must be dotted or every "t" must be crossed.
Rather, the writing must at least appear complete enough to be a
symbol "of value, right, privilege, or identification." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-501(2); cf. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102(13); Utah Code
Ann. § 41-2-404(1); State v. Ortega, 418 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Iowa 1988).
4

The applicable sections of the forgery statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-501, reads:
-[footnote continued on next page]-
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but the crime of forgery nevertheless requires the involved
"writing" to symbolize something "of value, right, privilege, or
identification."

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2).

No rights or

privileges attach to an invalid license.5
Because the State classified the forgeries as second
degree felonies, (R 102, 104, 106, 108, 110); (T 14); it was also
required to prove that the writing was (or purportedly had been)

4 -[footnote continued](1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to
defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating
a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates,
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so
that the writing or the making, completion, execution,
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or
utterance purports to be the act of another, . . . "
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing
or any other method of recording information,, checks,
tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks,
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege,
or identification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the
writing is or purports to be:
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any other
instrument or writing issued by a government, or any
agency thereof[.]
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501.
5

A symbol "of value, right, privilege, or
identification[,]" as expressed in the forged writing definition,
applies specifically to the involved temporary driver's permits.
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102(13) ("'License' means the privilege
issued under this chapter to operate a motor vehicle"); Utah Code
Ann. § 41-2-404 (pertaining to the contents and specifications of an
identification card).

- 6 -

"issued by a government, or any agency thereof[.]"
§ 76-6-501(3).

Utah Code Ann.

In the case at bar, all the spaces identifying the

licensee were left blank.

See State's Exhibits 1-3; Appendix 3.

Facially void, the arresting officers even admitted that the
confiscated instruments were not useable in their present form as
temporary driver's permits.

(R 32); (T 68, 79).

The numerous blank spaces made it apparent that the
licenses had not been issued by the government, nor could a
reasonable jury infer that the Division of Motor Vehicles would
issue such a license to an individual and allow him or her to
independently fill in the necessary information.

£f. Utah Code Ann.

§ 41-2-404(1) ("The commissioner shall issue a card of
identification which provides all the information contained in the
application, other than place of birth, and a photograph of the
applicant and facsimile of the applicant's signature").

Absent

completion of the pertinent identifying information, the partially
completed licenses did not represent a symbol "of value, right,
privilege, or identification."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2).

No

governmental "writing" therefore existed.
The plain language of the permits also supports this
conclusion.

Conspicuously displayed on each license is the

following notation:

"Not Valid Without Licensee's Signature."

State's Exhibits 1-3; Appendix 3.

See

As long as the licensee's

signature line remains blank, the license cannot be considered
governmentally issued.

Hence, even if an authorized examiner and

- 7

director signed their names and filled in most of the information, a
license lacking the licensee's signature would still be invalid.
The notation expressly stated on the temporary permits is
a requirement implicitly placed on other symbols of value, right,
privilege, or identification.

A check, for example, would not yet

symbolize an instrument of monetary value if it lacked the drawer's
signature.
(1980).

Cf. Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-3-104(1)(a), 70A-3-401(l)

Once the check is signed, however, it becomes bearer paper

even if the remaining spaces (e.g. date, payee, and amount) are left
blank.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-1-201(5), 70A-3-111(c).

Completion of the signature line is an act vital to an instrument's
symbolic value, an act giving the instrument legal efficacy.
Thus, an unauthorized individual in possession of a
government checkbook would not be guilty of forgery even if he
transferred it to a third party and told the party how to complete
it.

Other statutory proscriptions may encompass such behaviors, see

Point II, or situations in which the individual completed less
essential blank spaces before transference, see, e.g., Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-4-101, 76-6-501 (attempted forgery), but the individual's
actions would not amount to forgery.
Petitioner did not, as the Singh opinion stated, argue
merely "that, because the bogus permits were incomplete, they were
not writings within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2)(a)
(1990)."

Singh, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40.

In fact, Petitioner

Singh concedes that an incomplete instrument may still fall under
the forgery statute.

The issue here, though, is whether the
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involved permits were complete enough to constitute a "writing"
symbolizing a governmentally issued "value, right, privilege, or
identification."

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2), -(3). As

discussed above and as revealed by the permits themselves, the
temporary licenses were not adequately completed.

See Stated

Exhibits 1-3; Appendix 3.
Just as forgery does not apply to the transfer of a
government checkbook—insufficiently completed but marked on
nonetheless, so too should the crime not apply to the transfer of
temporary driver's permits—predominately blank, admittedly still
unuseable, and not yet legally efficacious.
specifically proscribed such conduct.

Other offenses more

See infra Point II; Floyd v.

Western Surgical Assocs., 773 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah App. 1989) ("Under
general rules of statutory construction, where two statutes treat
the same subject matter, and one statute is general while the other
is specific, the specific provision controls"); Perry v. Pioneer
Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 216 (Utah 1984); cf. Helmuth v.
Morris, 598 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah 1979) (a specifically designed
provision [of the Controlled Substances Act] governs over the more
generally restrictive forgery statute).
Closely related to this issue is the Singh holding
regarding the insufficiency of the evidence.6

6

The court found:

The standard of review for an insufficiency of the
evidence argument is well established. "A jury conviction is
reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
-[footnote continued on next page]-
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The jury could reasonably have inferred that
the permits purported to be government issued
documents symbolizing identification and the
privilege of operating motor vehicles on public
highways. The jury could also reasonably have
inferred that defendant transferred the permits
fully contemplating their eventual fraudulent use of
them. We therefore conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to convict defendant of forgery.
Sinah. 171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41.
At least for purposes of a forgery analysis, improperly
intertwined in the Singh conclusion is the anticipated criminal
involvement of another party.

Even if Petitioner Singh transferred

the permits and contemplated their eventual fraudulent use, the
other party commits a forgery only after that party follows Singh's
suggestions.

Up until that time or until the essential blank spaces

are completed, there would only be a transfer of nonlegally
efficacious permits.

No forgery occurred.

But see Point II.

POINT II
PETITIONER'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GIVEN
Assuming, arguendo, the Singh opinion properly concluded
that a "writing" issued by the government (the temporary driver's

6 -[footnote continued]viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted." State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141,
1147 (Utah 1989). The "legal efficacy" argument, however, involves
a question of law and is the premise upon which the insufficiency
argument rests. Due to their overlapping nature, the arguments are
addressed together rather than in separate subsections.
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permits) may be devoid of information identifying the licensee, the
trial court nonetheless erred when it refused to instruct the jury
on Attempted Forgery, Prohibited Use of a license, and Theft by
Receiving Stolen Property.

(T 110-18); (R 60-81).

This issue

presented a question of law and was reviewed for correctness.
State v. Sinah, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 41 (Utah App. 1991) (citation
omitted).
The well-recognized general rule entitles a party to
have his theory of the case submitted to the jury.
Where there is evidence adduced to support a party's
theory of the case, it is prejudicial error for the
trial court to fail to instruct thereon.
Nevertheless, the court cannot be said to have
failed to properly instruct the jury when requested
instructions are fully covered in other instructions
given.
Watters v. Ouerrv, 626 P.2d 455, 458-59 (Utah 1981) (footnotes
omitted).
Since the jury was given only one instruction in the
trial court below, it was forced to choose between a forgery
conviction or a complete acquittal.

Apparently believing that

Petitioner Singh had done something wrong, the jury opted for the
conviction.

But see State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986)

("This is exactly the sort of forced choice that lesser included
offense instructions are designed to avoid, and exactly the choice
that the jury would not have had to make if [the lesser included
offense] instruction had been given11); State v. BakerP 671 P.2d 152,
157 (Utah 1983) ("where proof of an element of the crime is in
dispute, the availability of the 'third option'—the choice of
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conviction of a lesser offense rather than conviction of the greater
or acquittal—gives the defendant the benefit of the reasonable
doubt standard")•
The instruction for a lesser included offense "must be
given if (i) the statutory elements of greater and lesser included
offenses overlap to some degree, and (ii) the evidence provides a
'rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.'"

State

v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) (construing State v. Baker.
671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983)); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4)
(1990).

The two-pronged Baker analysis "should be liberally

construed[,]" Hansen. 734 P.2d at 424, especially where, as here,
the defendant requested the lesser included offense instruction.7
A.

The "Attempted Forgery" Instruction Should Have
Been Given

The Singh opinion erred in its consideration of "whether
Baker required the trial court to instruct the jury on the offense
of attempted forgery, a third degree felony under Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-6-501 and 76-4-102." State v. Singh. 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 39,

7

See also Point II.C. The prosecution must show more
compelling circumstances than the defendant when it requests the
lesser included offense instruction. State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421,
424 n.5 (Utah 1986). Unlike the minimal standard place on the
defendant, see id. at 424 ("the test is whether the elements overlap
at all"), "when the prosecution seeks instruction on a proposed
lesser included offense, both the legal elements and the actual
evidence or inferences needed to demonstrate those elements must
necessarily be included within the original charged offense." State
v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1983) (emphasis in original).
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41-42 (Utah App. 1991).

Although the opinion noted initially that

the forgery and attempted forgery offenses satisfied Baker's first
prong, it erred subsequently in concluding that "the jury had no
rational basis to acquit defendant of forgery and to convict him of
attempted forgery.11

Id. at 42. The Singh court reasoned:

Defendant argues that, because he left blank spaces
in the permits, the jury may have believed that he
"did not fully satisfy the act of forgery."
Defendant's argument misapprehends the nature
of his convictions. As the record discloses, he was
not charged with forgery for creating forged driver
permits. Defendant was charged and convicted for
transferring the bogus permits. The only acts
defendant was required to complete were the
transfers of the permits. In this case, the bogus
permits entered the undercover officers' hands as
they left defendant's hands, and the transfers were
then and there complete. Defendant presented no
evidence at trial to dispute that these transfers
occurred. Under the evidence presented, the jury
had no rational basis to find that defendant did not
actually transfer the permits.
Singh. 171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 42 (emphasis in original).
As discussed above, it was not simply the existence of
blank spaces that precluded the charge of forgery; rather, no
forgery occurred because the blank spaces were material and
essential to the permits' efficacy.

See supra Point I.

Regardless

of whether the forgery convictions involved a "transfer" or
"creation," there was no transfer of a "writing" as defined by the
forgery statute.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-501(2), -(3); see also

State v. Velarde. 734 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986) ("in determining
whether a rational jury could acquit on the greater charge and find
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guilt on the lesser charge, the court must view the evidence and the
inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to
the defendant").
Indeed, if forgery required only a "transfer" of an
instrument, Petitioner would have committed the crime without making
a single marking or saying a word.

By analogy, the Singh holding

could impermissibly render the simple transfer of a stolen checkbook
into a forgery.
Moreover, the testimony of two State witnesses,
Detectives Wright and Mays, provided a rational basis for acquittal.
Both officers conceded that the partially completed licenses, in the
form as sold to them, were not valid temporary permits.

See (T 68);

(T 79) (wherein Detective Mays testified that permits without
"information as to the identity of the person" would not be valid);
cf. (R 32) ("At the preliminary hearing Officer Holly Wright and
Detective Carroll Mays testified that the partially completed forms
were not useable as temporary permits").

The evidence provided the

jury with a rational basis for finding that there were no transfers
of (purported) symbols of "value, right, privilege, or
identification."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2); see also State's

Exhibits 1-3; Appendix 2 (the notation displayed on each permit is
"Not Valid Without Licensee's Signature") ; cj£. State v. Brown, 694
P.2d 587, 590 (Utah 1984) (if the jury could have accepted evidence
concerning a lesser included offense, "however unlikely that might
have been," it was error to refuse the instruction).
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Both prongs of the Baker test were met.

The court should

have instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted
forgery.

See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(3) (a) (,fNo defense to

the offense of attempt shall arise . . . [b]ecause the offense
attempted was actually committed . . . f f ) ; accord State v. Burks, 29
Utah 2d 378, 510 P.2d 532 (1973).

The jury could have properly

viewed Petitioner Singh's actions as only constituting a
"substantial step" toward the crime of forgery.
B.

The "Prohibited Use of a License" Instruction
Should Have Been Given

Assuming legal efficacy is not also incorporated into the
definition of a license, Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102(13); see supra
note 5 and accompany text, Baker's two-pronged test was similarly
met for the Prohibited Use of a License Instruction.
§ 41-2-133(1).

Utah Code Ann.

The statute states, "It is a class B misdemeanor for

a person to . . . display or cause to permit to be displayed or to
have in possession any license knowing it is fictitious or has been
canceled, denied, revoked, suspended, disqualified, or altered[.]"
Id.

The forgery statute similarly requires, inter alia, that a

person act with the purpose to defraud or facilitate a fraud.
Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1).

Utah

The trial court acknowledged the

applicability of the omitted offense:
[The State]: We couldn't charge under that statute
[Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-133], Judge.
The Court: You could have under (1). You could
have charged under 41-2-133. It's a misdemeanor for
a person to display or cause or permit to be
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displayed or to have in possession any license
knowing it is fictitious, [you] could have charged
under that if you had wished to.
What you're saying is, you charged under the
fraud statute because you had the transfer.
[The State]: And the additional element raised it
to this charge [forgery].
(T 18) .
The concerns regarding a transfer were irrelevant.

Even

if the greater offense includes additional elements, the lesser
offense may still be included.

See State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421,

424 (Utah 1986) ("the test is whether the elements overlap at all");
State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983) ("where two offenses
are related because some of their statutory elements overlap, and
where the evidence at the trial of the greater offense includes
proof of some or all of those overlapping elements, the lesser
offense is an included offense under [Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-402] (3) (a),f) . Consequently, Baker's first prong was
satisfied and, as noted previously, the second prong was also met.
See supra Point II.A.
In the alternative, Petitioner also argued that the
"Prohibited Use of a License" instruction was more specifically
tailored for the involved conduct than the generally worded forgery
statute.

(T 14-16, 115); Appellant's opening brief at 19 n.7;

Appellant's reply brief at 7-8; compare Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-133
with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501; Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333
(Utah 1979); Floyd v. Western Surgical Assocs., 773 P.2d 401, 404
(Utah App. 1989); Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d
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214, 216 (Utah 1984); see also State v. Shondel. 22 Utah 2d 343, 453
P.2d 146 (1969),

Contrary to the position of the Singh opinion,

Petitioner's requested instruction was not an attempt to "misapply
the law" or "[subvert] the second prong of the Baker test."
v. Sinah. 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 42 (Utah App. 1991).

State

Rather,

Petitioner simply sought to give the jury another instruction for
its consideration.

Cf. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 213

(1973) (emphasis in original) ("Where one of the elements of the
offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly
guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in
favor of conviction").
C.

The "Theft by Receiving Stolen Property"
Instruction Should Have Been Given

The Singh opinion declined to consider whether "the trial
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of theft
by receiving stolen property, a third degree felony under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-408." Singh, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 42 n.2.

It

contended that the argument was raised for the first time on appeal.
Id.

Mr. Singh, however, expressly preserved this argument at trial,

see (T 110-12) (attached as Appendix 4); (R 60-61); he listed the
appropriate citations in his brief, see Appellant's opening brief
at 5, 11, 17-18; and his objections were recognized fully by the
State.

See Appellee's brief at 18-19 n.10.
For reasons similar to those discussed above, the theft

by receiving stolen property instruction should have been given to
the jury.

"A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or
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disposes of the property of another . . . or aids in concealing,
selling, or withholding any such property from the owner, knowing
the property to be stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner
thereof."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1).

The generally worded

forgery statute requires that a person act with the purpose to
defraud or facilitate a fraud.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1).

The

overlapping element of fraudulent conduct thus satisfied the first
prong.

Baker's second prong was also satisfied.

See Point II.A.

REASONS JUSTIFYING THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT
Utah's supreme court has not squarely addressed whether
forgery contains the element of "legal efficacy."
P. 46(d).

See Utah R. App.

Although forgery occurs often, an instrument's efficacy

has not previously been questioned because of the apparent
sufficiency and completeness of the involved document.

The

circumstances of this case properly raise such an issue.
More importantly, the Singh opinion's rejection of
Petitioner's proposed jury instructions conflicts directly with this
Court's past mandates regarding forced jury verdicts, specific
provisions governing over generally worded statutes, and lesser
included offenses.

See Utah R. App. P. 46(b).

Despite its

reference to Baker's two-pronged test, the Sinah opinion misapplied
the noted standard.

At the very least, the jury should have been

able to consider the "attempted forgery" instruction.

- 18 -

CONCLUSION
Petitioner Singh respectfully requests that this Court
grant his petition for writ of certiorari and review the issues
addressed herein.
SUBMITTED this

1^

day of November, 1991.
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OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
Channan S. Singh appeals from a conviction
of five counts of forgery, ail second degree
felonies under Utah Code Ann. §76-6501(3Xa) (1990), and one count of being a
habitual criminal under Utah Code Ann. §768-101 (1990). Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, and the trial court's
refusal to instruct the jury on lesser included
offenses. We affirm.
FACTS
' On November 27, 1989, West Valley City
detective Holly Wright, working undercover
with the Metro Sting Unit, followed an informant's tip to a West Valley City residence to
buy a driver's license from Bobby Sanchez.
When Detective Wright arrived, Sanchez was
not at the residence, but defendant, Channan
S. Singh, was present. Defendant sold two
partially completed Driver License Temporary
Counter Permits to Detective Wright for one
hundred dollars. Each permit bore an examination test score, an expiration date, and signatures purporting to be those of an examiner
and the director of the Driver License Division
for the Department of Public Safety. The
permits remained blank as to the name,
PE REPORTS
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height, weight, sex, eye color, hair color, and
date of birth of the holder.
^Subsequently, on December 7, 1989, Detective Wright visited defendant's apartment in
Salt Lake City, where she purchased two more
of the partially completed permits from defendant for one hundred dollars. When Detective^Wright asked defendant how to fill out
the^missing information on the permits, he
told her to print her name and address on the
forms. When Detective Wright informed defendant that she did not want to use her real
name because warrants had been issued for
her arrest, defendant said: "Then put down
any name you want." Defendant also instructed Detective Wright to make up a ninedigit number and write it in the space for the
license number.
On December 12, 1989, Detective Wright
again met with defendant, this time at the
undercover sting location, to purchase more
temporary driver permits. Detective Wright
informed defendant that she did not have the
money for the permits, but that her brother,
Chance, would arrive later to make payment.
Chance was another undercover officer, Detective Carroll Mays, of the Salt Lake City
Police Department. Defendant left fifteen
blank permits at the sting location and returned later to collect payment.
Defendant told Detective Mays that he
normally sold the permits for fifty dollars
each, but that he was willing to sell all fifteen
for four hundred dollars. He assured Detective
Mays that, when completed, the permits
worked well as identification, boasting that he
himself had used one after being pulled over
and had encountered "no problems." Detective
Mays told defendant that he planned to resell
the permits to others, but that he was reluctant to buy them because he did not know
how to finish filling them out. Defendant then
demonstrated how to fill in the director's and
examiner's signatures, as well as examination
results, on one of the permits. As defendant
filled out the permit, he told Detective Mays
to place the official signatures as he had, and
to fill in the identifying information for the
eventual purchasers.
Defendant was later arrested and charged
with five counts of forgery, a second degree
felony, for transferring a writing which purported to be a government issued license.
Defendant was also charged with being a
habitual criminal.
At the preliminary hearing, defendant
moved to quash the bindover order and
dismiss all charges on the ground that the
driver permits were facially incomplete and
thus incapable of facilitating a fraud within
the meaning of the forgery statute. Defendant
also argued that he should have been charged
under the motor vehicle code for prohibited
use of a license, rather than forgery. Prior to
- *
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information on the same grounds. At trial,
defendant requested the court to instruct the
jury on the alleged lesser included offenses of
attempted forgery and prohibited use of a
license. The trial court refused to give the
requested instructions, and defendant was
convicted on all counts.
Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) there
was insufficient evidence to convict him of
forgery under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501
(1990), and (2) the trial court erred in refusing
to instruct the jury on the lesser offenses of
attempted forgery, prohibited use of license,
and theft by receiving stolen property.1
%

* STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Defendant argues that, because the bogus
driver permits were incomplete, they were not
writings within the meaning of Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-50 l(2)(a) (1990). Therefore,
the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that he transferred forged writings under
the forgery statute.
'" ' I
The forgery statute specifies that a person is
guilty of forgery if the person, with intent to
defraud, transfers a writing purported to be
the act of another. Utah Code Ann. §76-6r
501 (1990). A writing can include "printing or
any other method of recording information
checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit card£
badges, trademarks, money, and any other
symbols of value, right, privilege, or identify
cation." Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 (2)(aj
(1990).
i%
Before we consider the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which defendant was convicted^
we consider defendant's argument that section
76-6-501 incorporates elements of legal
efficacy and completeness.
••&&'
"We review for correctness a trial court^
statutory interpretation, according it no particular deference." State v. Jaimez, 167 Utah
Adv. Rep. 21, 24 (Utah App. 1991); State F*
Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah Ap£
1991)(citations omitted).
" ^
In construing a legislative enactment, this
court's primary responsibility is "to give effect
to the intent of the legislature." Stare v. Jooes^
735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. 1987). WhffC
statutory language is clear and unambiguous
we will not look further to divine legislative
intent, but will construe the statute according
to its plain language. Id.; Jaimez, 167 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 24.
Despite defendant's efforts to add add-^
onal elements to the statute, we find section^
6-501(2) to be clear and unambiguous..
Nothing in that section, or any other sectwg
of the forgery statute, suggests that the te&£
lature intended that an instrument be l e g w
effective or complete in order to constitute^
writing. In view of the plain language °f .IS?
Code Ann. §76-6-501, we conclude J *
defendant's interpretation is untenable. t':^4r

Singh
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SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
We now consider defendant's argument that
the State failed to present evidence sufficient
to convict him of the crime of forgery.
Our standard in reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence when a defendant
jias been convicted in a jury trial is wellestablished:
[T]he evidence and the reasonable
inferences which may be drawn
therefrom must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the jury
verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only
when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he
was convicted.
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah
1989)(citations omitted).
In this case, defendant asserts that the State
bailed to present evidence sufficient to prove
that he transferred symbols of value, right,
privilege, or identification, that is, writings
within the meaning of the statute. However,
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the jury's verdict, we find that sufficient
evidence was presented to establish the elements of forgery.
In this case, the evidence was neither inconclusive nor improbable. Defendant did not
contest having sold the temporary driver
permits to Detectives Wright and Mays. Nor
did he offer any evidence controverting any of
the State's evidence. At trial, the two detectives described three separate occasions on
which they purchased such permits from defendant. Both detectives testified that the
permits were identical to Utah Driver License
Temporary Counter Permits, except that identifying information and, on some permits,
the director's and examiner's signatures
remained to be inserted. Detective Wright
testified that defendant instructed her on how
to fill in the identifying information so she
could use the permit herself. Detective Mays
testified that defendant instructed him on how
to fill out the director's and examiner's signatures and examination results so that Detective Mays could resell the permits to others
for identification purposes. Moreover, Detective Mays testified of defendant's boast that
he had sold many such permits to people who
regularly used them for identification, and he
testified that defendant even bragged that he
had successfully used one himself during a
traffic stop. Finally, the permits which defendant sold to Detectives Wright and Mays
were admitted into evidence and the jury was
given an opportunity to inspect them.
UTAH
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The jury could reasonably have inferred that
the permits purported to be governme^ issued
documents symbolizing identification and the
privilege of operating motor vehicles on public
highways. The jury could also reasonably have
inferred that defendant transferred the permits
fully contemplating their eventual fraudulent
use of them. We therefore conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to convia defendant of
forgery.

INSTRUCTIONS ON LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSES
Finally, we consider defendant's claim that
the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the
jury on lesser included offenses. Defendant
argues that the trial court erred in refusing his
requests to instruct the jury on the offenses of
attempted forgery and prohibited use of a
license.2 He also argues that by this refusal,
the court prevented him from presenting his
theory of the case to the jury.
An appeal challenging the trial court's
refusal to give requested jury instructions
presents questions of law. State v. Perdue, 813
P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App. 1991). Therefore,
we review the trial court's determinations for
correctness and accord them no particular
deference. Id.; State v. Jaimez, 167 U* * Adv.
Rep. 21, 24 (Utah App. 1991).
When a defendant requests that th iry be
instructed on lesser included offenses, we
apply a two-tier 'evidence-based standard*
to determine whether the requested instructions should be given. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d
152, 159 (Utah 1983). Under that standard,
two conditions must be satisfied before a trial
court is required to give the requested instructions: (1) the statutory elements of the
offense charged must overlap with those ;>f the
included offenses; and (2) the evidence
adduced at trial must provide a rational basis
for a verdict acquitting defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him or her of
the included offense. Id. at 158-59. The first
prong of the Baker analysis is essentially a
mechanical, side-by-side comparison of the
statutorily defined elements of the crimes.
The second prong of the BaJcer analysis
requires the court, without judging the credibility of the evidence presented, to determine
"whether there is a sufficient quantum of
evidence presented to justify sending the question to the jury." Id. at 159. If the evidence
presented would enable a jury to acquit on the
crime charged, and to convict on the lesser
offense, the question should be submitted to
the jury, and the instruction should be given. Id.
This prong is designed to preserve the
jury's privilege of assessing the credibility of
evidence and yet protect that weighing process
from "red herrings." Id.
We first consider whether Baker rec :red
the trial court to instruct the jury . the
offense of attempted forgery, a third degree
{CF RFPOPTQ
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felony under Utah Code Ann. §§76-6-501 them to the detectives. However, defendant
and 76-4-102. The first prong of the test is presented no evidence to challenge the fact
satisfied because the elements of forgery and that he transferred the permits to the detectattempted forgery necessarily overlap. With ives, and no other explanation for the fact
respect to the second prong, the question is that he possessed and displayed those permits.
whether the jury could have acquitted defen- Under the evidence presented at trial, the jury
dant of forgery and convicted him of attem- rationally could not have acquitted defendant
pted forgery under the facts proved at trial. Id of forgery and still convicted him of prohibat 159. Defendant argues that, because he ited use of a license. In fact, in the context of
left blank spaces in the permits, the jury may this case, rather than a lesser included offense,
have believed that he "did not fully satisfy the prohibited use of a license could have constiact of forgery."
tuted an additional offense.
Defendant's argument misapprehends the
Finally, although a defendant is "entitled to
nature of his convictions. As the record disc- have the jury instructed on the law applicable
loses, he was not charged with forgery for to its theory of the case if there is any reasocreating forged driver permits. Defendant was nable basis in the evidence to justify it," State
charged and convicted for transferring the v. Torres, 619 P.2d.694, 695 (Utah 1980); State
bogus permits. The only acts defendant was v. Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App.
required to complete were the transfers of the 1989), such instruction must still measure up
permits. In this case, the bogus permits to the requirements of Baker, which it did not
entered the undercover officers' hands as they do. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court
left defendant's hands, and the transfers were did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on
then and there complete. Defendant presented additional offenses.
no evidence at trial to dispute that these traAffirmed.
nsfers occurred. Under the evidence presented,
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
the jury had no rational basis to find that
defendant did not actually transfer the WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
permits. Therefore, the jury had no rational
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
basis to acquit defendant of forgery and to
convict him of attempted forgery.
Defendant also argues that the trial court 1. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in
should have instructed the jury on attempted refusing to give his instructions because he is entiforgery because "the jury still may have con- tled to give the jury his theory of the case. This
sidered the blank spaces significant enough to argument is incorporated in defendant's lesser incacquit [defendant] of forgery had the lesser luded offenses argument because every defendant
who requests an instruction for a lesser-included
included offense of attempted forgery been offense is essentially requesting an instruction reflavailable." This argument suggests that the ecting his or her theory of the case.
trial court should have given the jury the 2. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in
opportunity to misapply the law. The argu- refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of theft
ment ignores the important principle of cons- by receiving stolen property, a third degree felony
istency in the application of the law, and under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408. Because
subverts the second prong of the Baker test. defendant raises this argument for the first time on
We conclude that the trial court did not err in appeal, we do not consider it. State v. Valdcz, 432
refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 1967).
attempted forgery.
Defendant also argues that the trial court
was required to instruct the jury on the
offense of prohibited use of a license, a class
B misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. §412-133. Under Baker, the trial court was
required to give the instruction only if there
was a rational basis for the jury to acquit
defendant of forgery and to convict him of
prohibited use of a license. Baker, 671 P.2d at
1^9. The prohibited use of a license statute
proscribes the display or possession of a
license that is known to be fictitious, canceled,
denied, revoked, suspended, disqualified, or
altered. Utah Code Ann. §41-2-133 (Supp.
1991).
In this case, the State presented uncontroverted evidence that defendant sold bogus
driver permits to undercover detectives. Naturally, incident to his sale and transfer of the
permits, defendant possessed and displayed
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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M U i U t l VEHICLES

41-2-102. Definitions.

OPERATORS' UCENSE ACT

1

As used in this chapter:
. J|
(1) "Cancellation" means the termination by action of the division o f B
license issued through error or fraud or for which necessary consent ha£
been withdrawn.
.. jdj
(2) "Class D license" means the class of license issued for vehicles noffl
defined as commercial vehicles or motorcycles under this title.
(E
(3) "Class M license" means the class of license issued for a motorcycled
as defined under this chapter.
m
(4) "Commercial driver license (CDL)" means a license issued substanJ
tially in accordance with the requirements of Title XII, Pub. L. 99-5701
the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, and in accordance with]
Part 7, Chapter 2, Title 41, which authorizes the holder to drive a class ofl
commercial motor vehicle.
jfl
(5) (a) "Commercial motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle designed o n
used to transport passengers or property if the vehicle:
m
(i) has a gross vehicle weight rating of 26,001 or more poundsj
or a lesser rating as determined by federal regulation;
••9
(ii) is designed to transport more than 15 passengers, include
ing the driver; or
m
(iii) is transporting hazardous materials and is required to b e j
placarded in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 172, Subpart F J
(b) The following vehicles are not considered a commercial motor]!
vehicle for purposes of Part 7, Chapter 2, Title 41, the Uniform ComJI
mercial Driver License Act:
lm
(i) equipment owned and operated by the United States De-1
partment of Defense when operated by any active duty military]
personnel and members of the reserves and national guard on J
active duty including personnel on full-time national guard duty, j
personnel on part-time training, and national guard military 1
technicians and civilians who are required to wear military uni-jj
forms and are subject to the code of military justice;
hi
(ii) vehicles controlled and operated by a farmer to transport]
agricultural products, farm machinery, or farm supplies to or 2
from a farm within 150 miles of his farm but not in operation a s ]
contract or common motor carrier;
' g
(iii) Orefighting and emergency vehicles; and
fi
(iv) recreational vehicles that are not used in commerce and. i
are operated solely as family or personal conveyances for recrea-j
tional purposes.
*M
(6) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of the Department of Pub-^J
lie Safety.
~m
(7) "Denial" or "denied" means the withdrawal of a driving privilege by »
the division to which the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 12a, Title 41,'S
Proof of Owner's or Operator's Security, do not apply.
.,j|
(8) "Disqualification" means either:
M
(a) the suspension, revocation, cancellation, denial, or any other •
withdrawal by a state of a person's privileges to drive a commercial j |
motor vehicle;
if
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(b) a determination by the Federal Highway Administration, under 49 C.F.R. Part 386, that a person is no longer qualified to operate
a commercial motor vehicle under 49 C.F.R. Part 391; or
(c) the loss of qualification which automatically follows conviction
of an offense listed in 49 C.F.R. Part 383.51.
(9) "Division" means the Driver License Division of the Department of
Public Safety.
(10) "Drive" means:
(a) to operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle upon a
highway; and
(b) in Subsections 41-2-715(1) through (3), Subsection 41-2-715(5),
and Sections 41-2-716 and 41-2-717, the operation or physical control
of a motor vehicle at any place within the state.
(11) "Farm tractor" means every motor vehicle designed and used primarily as a farm implement for drawing plows, mowing machines, and
other implements of husbandry.
(12) "Highway" means the entire width between property lines of every
way or place of any nature when any part of it is open to the use of the
public, as a matter of right, for vehicular traffic.
(13) "License" means the privilege issued under this chapter to operate
a motor vehicle.
(14) "License certificate" means the evidence of the privilege issued
under this chapter to operate a motor vehicle.
(15) "Motor vehicle" means every self-propelled vehicle and every vehicle propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but
not operated upon rails, except motorized wheel chairs and vehicles
moved solely by human power.
(16) "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle, other than a tractor, having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel with not
more than three wheels in contact with the ground.
(17) "Nonresident" means a person who is not a resident of this state
and who has not sojourned or engaged in any gainful occupation in this
state for an aggregate period of 60 days in the preceding 12 months and
also every person who is temporarily assigned by his employer to work in
Utah.
(18) "Operate" means to be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.
(19) "Operator" means any person who is in actual physical control of a
vehicle.
(20) "Owner" means a person other than a lienholder having an interest in the property or title to a vehicle. The term includes a person entitled to the use and possession of a vehicle subject to a security interest in
another person but excludes a lessee under a lease not intended as security.
(21) "Person" means every natural person, firm, partnership, association, or corporation.
(22) "Reportable violation" means an offense required to be reported to
the Driver License Division as determined by the division and includes
those offenses against which points are assessed under Section 41-2-128.
(23) "Revocation" means the termination by action of the division of a
licensee's privilege to operate a motor vehicle.
105

41-2-111. Temporary learner permit — Instruction permit
— Commercial driver instruction permit
(1) (a) The division upon receiving an application for a class D or M license
from a person 16 years of age or older may in its discretion issue a temporary learner permit after the person has successfully passed all parts of
the examination not involving the actual operation of a motor vehicle,
(b) The temporary learner permit allows the applicant, while having
the permit in his immediate possession, to operate a motor vehicle upon
the highways for six months from the date of the application in conformance with the restrictions indicated on the permit as determined by
rules of the division.
(2) The division upon receiving an application may in its discretion issue an
instruction permit effective for one year to an applicant who is enrolled in a
driver education program that includes practice driving if the program is
approved by the State Office of Education even though the applicant has not
reached the legal age to be eligible for a license. The instruction permit entitles the permittee when he has the permit in his immediate possession to
operate a motor vehicle, only when an approved instructor is occupying a seat
beside the permittee.

41-2-133- Prohibited uses of license — Penalty.
It is a class B misdemeanor for a person to:
(1) display or cause or permit to be displayed or to have in possession
any license knowing it is fictitious or has been canceled, denied, revoked,
suspended, disqualified, or altered;
(2) lend or knowingly permit the use of a license issued to him, by a
person not entitled to it;
(3) display or to represent as his own a license not issued to him;
(4) fail or refuse to surrender to the division upon demand any license
which has been denied, suspended, disqualified, canceled, or revoked;
(5) use a false name or give a false address in any application for a
license or any renewal or duplicate of the license, or to knowingly make a
^Jajsezstatemeat^or to knowingly conceal a material fact or otherwise
<^commit a fraucto^ the application; or
^^(C) peiTGrTany other prohibited use of a license issued to him.

41-2-404- Identification card — Contents — Specifications.
(1) The commissioner shall issue a card of identification which provides all
the information contained in the application, other than place of birth, and a
photograph of the applicant and facsimile of the applicant's signature.
(2) The card shall be of an impervious material, resistant to wear, damage,
and alteration- The size, form, and color of the card is prescribed by the
commissioner.
(3) At the applicant's request, the card may include a statement that the
applicant has a special medical problem or allergies to certain drugs, for the
purpose of medical treatment.
(4) The card may also indicate the applicant's intent to make an anatomical
gift, under the same procedure as provided for an operator license under
Subsection 41-2-121(3).

70A-1-201

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
PART 2

GENERAL DEFINITIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION
Section
70A-1-20L
70A-1-202.
70A-1-203.
70A-1-201
70A-1-205.
70A-1-206.
70A-1-207.
70A-1-208.

General definitions.
Prima facie evidence by third-party documents.
Obligation of good faith.
Time — Reasonable time — "Seasonably."
Course of dealing and usage of trade.
Statute of frauds for kinds of personal property not otherwise covered.
Performance or acceptance under reservation of rights.
Option to accelerate at will.

70A-1-20L General definitions. Subject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent chapters of this act which are applicable to specific chapters or parts thereof, and unless the context otherwise requires,
in this act
(1) "Action" in the sense of a judicial proceeding includes recoupment,
counterclaim, setoff, suit in equity and any other proceedings in
which rights are determined.
(2) "Aggrieved party" means a party entitled to resort to a remedy.
(3) "Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in
their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance
as provided in this act (sections 70A-1 205 and 70A-2-208). Whether
an agreement has legal consequences is determined by the provisions of this act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of contracts
(section 70A-1103). (Compare "Contract")
(4) "Bank" means any person engaged in the business of banking.
(5) "Bearer" means the person in possession of an instrument, document of title, or security payable to bearer or indorsed in blank.
(6) "Bill of lading" means a document evidencing the receipt of goods
for shipment issued by a person engaged in the business of transporting or forwarding goods, and includes an airbill. "Airbill"
means a document serving for air transportation as a bill of lading
does for marine or rail transportation, and includes an air consignment note or air waybill.
(7) "Branch" includes a separately incorporated foreign branch of a
bank.
(8) "Burden of establishing" a fact means the burden of persuading the
triers of fact that the existence of the fact is more probable than
its nonexistence.
(9) "Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good
faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation
of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the
goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of
selling goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker. All
persons who sell minerals or the like (including oil and gas) at

F
o f ne
^P"3;.1.04-. ° / f
. ?°tiable instruments • "Certificate of deposit" — "Note."

(1)

(2)

(3)

"Draft- -

"Check"

Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this chapter must
(a)
be signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b)
contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no other promise, order, obligation or
power given by the maker or drawer except as authorized by
this chapter, and
(c)
be payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(d)
be payable to order or to bearer.
A writing which complies with the requirements of this section is
(a)
a "draft" ("bill of exchange") if it is an order;
(b)
a "check" if it is a draft drawn on a bank and payable on
demand;
(c)
a "certificate of deposit" if it is an acknowledgment by a
bank of receipt of money with an engagement to repay it;
(d)
a "note" if it is a promise other than a certificate of deposit.
As used in other chapters of this act, and as the context may
require, the terms "draft," "check," "certificate of deposit" and
"note" may refer to instruments which are not negotiable within
this chapter as well as to instruments which are so negotiable.

70A-3-11L Payable to bearer. An instrument is payable to bearer
when by its terms it is payable to
(a) bearer or the order of bearer; or
(b) a specified person or bearer, or
(c) "cash" or the order of "cash," or any other indication which does
not purport to designate a specific payee.

70A-3-401. Signature.
(1) No person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears
thereon.
(2) A signature is made by use of any name, including any trade or
assumed name, upon an instrument, or by any word or mark used
in lieu of a written signature.

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode —: Included offenses(3) A defendant may be convicted of an ofifense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the ofifense charged and the included
offense. An ofifense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the ofifense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an ofifense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.

76-4-101. Attempt — Elements of offense.
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step
toward commission of the offense,
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise:
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed
them to be.

76-4-102. Attempt — Classification of offenses.
Criminal attempt to commit:
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4 A felony of the third degree is a class A misdemeanor;
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A class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor
(
\ J i C ^sdemeanor is punishable by a penalty'not exceeding
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76-6-408, Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbrokers.
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding any such property from the owner, knowing the property to be
stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof.

76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for
treble damages against receiver of stolen propertyCD Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft;
or
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more
than $1,000;
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer,
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
$100 or less.

76-6-501. Forgery — '^Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery i£ with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) Alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent
or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in
a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method
of recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to
be:
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a government, or any agency thereof; or
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks,
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or
claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any
person or enterprise.
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be
a check with a face amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class A
misdemeanor.
182

76-8-1001. Habitual criminal — Determination.
Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed for
felony offenses at least one of which offenses having been at least a felony of
the second degree or a crime which, if committed within this state would have
been a capital felony, felony of the first degree or felony of second degree, and
was committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at least a felony of the
second degree committed in this state, other than murder in the first or second
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be imprisoned in the state
prison for from five years to life.
76-8-1002. Habitual criminal — Procedure — P u n i s h m e n t
(1) In charging a person with being a habitual criminal, the information or
complaintfiledbefore the committing magistrate shall allege the felony committed within the state of Utah and the two or more felony convictions relied
upon by the state of Utah.
(2) If the defendant is bound over to the district court for trial, the county
attorney shall in the information or complaint set forth the felony committed
within the state of Utah and the two or more previous felony convictions
relied upon for the charge of being a habitual criminal. If a jury is impaneled,
it shall not be told of the previous felony convictions or charge of being a
habitual criminal. The trial on the felony committed within the state of Utah
shall proceed as in other cases.
(3) If the court or jury finds the defendant guilty of the felony charged, then
the defendant shall be tried immediately by the same judge and jury, if a jury
was impaneled, on the charge of being a habitual criminal, unless the defendant has entered or enters a plea of guilty to the charge of being a habitual
criminal.
(4) No conviction may be admissible to establish the status of a habitual

78-2-2- Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to cany into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originate
ing with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer,
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capita] felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felon}*;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).

KUie 40. c o n s i d e r a t i o n s governing r e v i e w 01 certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
has so far departedfromthe accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by the Supreme Court.

Rule 48. Time for petitioning.
(a) Timeliness of petition. A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the
decision by the Court of Appeals.
(b) Refusal of petition. The clerk will refuse to receive any petition for a
writ of certiorari which is jurisdictionally out of time.
(c) Effect of petition for rehearing. The time for filing a petition for a
writ of certiorari runs from the date the decision is entered by the Court of
Appeals, not from the date of the issuance of the remittitur. If, however, a
petition for rehearing is timely filed by any party, the time for filing the
petition for a writ of certiorari for all parties runsfromthe date of the denial
of rehearing or of the entry of a subsequent decision entered upon the rehearing.

Rule 49. Petition for writ of certiorari.
(a) Contents. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, in the order
indicated:
(1) A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is
sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case in the Supreme Court contains the names of all parties.
# (2) A table of contents with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes, and authorities
cited, with references to the pages of the petition where they are cited.
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement
of the questions should be short and concise and should not be argumentative or repetitious. General conclusions, such as '"the decision of the Court
of Appeals is not supported by the law or facts," are not acceptable. The
statement of a question presented will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein. Only the questions set forth in
the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme
Court.
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any opinions
issued by the Court of Appeals.
(6) A concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is invoked, showing:
(A) the date of the entry of the decision sought to be reviewed;
(B) the date of the entry of any order respecting a rehearing and
the date of the entry and terms of any order granting an extension of
time within which to petition for certiorari;
(C) reliance upon Rule 47(c), where a cross-petition for a writ of
certiorari isfiled,stating the filing date of the petition for a writ of
certiorari in connection with which the cross-petition is filed; and
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Defendant.
* * *
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13
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MR. ALLBRIGHT:

No, your Honor.

(Whereupon, the bailiff was sworn at this time.)
THE COURT;

There are two verdict forms with each

count, guilty, and a not guilty form, and they're in
numerical order herein for your consideration. Around
12:00 o'clock, the bailiff will come in and take your order
and we'll get you some lunch.

We'll bring it in.

(Whereupon, the jury retired to the jury room at
11:20 a.m.)
THE COURT:

We'll be in informal recess until

11

the jury returns the verdict, and if you gentlemen wish,

12

the reporter will take your exceptions to the instructions.

13

MR. LOYD:

The first instruction that was not

14

given by the Court after the Court was requested to do so

15

by defense counsel reads as follows:

16

writing which, if genuine, might be of legal efficacy."

17

The citation for that is, that statement is an

"A forgery is a

18

element of forgery and is from United States vs. McGovern,

19

661 F.2D27 (3rd Circuit 1981) citing Gilbert vs. United

20

State,', 307 U.S. 658 L.Gd 2nd 750 (1962).

H

Second instruction not given by the Court after

**

requested to do 30 by defense counsel reads as follows:

23

"Before you can convict the defendant, CHANNAN SRAH SINGH,

**

of the crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property based

*'

on Counts I through V of the Information, you must believe

110

from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt,
each and every one of the following elements of that
offense:
1.

That the offense occurred on or about the

27th day of November, and the 7th and 12th day of December,
1989, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

That defendant, CHANNAN SRAH SINGH, acted

with the purpose to deprive the owner of the property
thereof,
3.

That said defendant, CHANNAN SRAH SINGH, did

receive, retain, or dispose of the property of another,
knowing that it had been stolen or believing that it
probably has been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds
or aids in concealing, selling or withholding any such
property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen.
4.

That the value of the property stolen was

more than $100 but does not exceed $250.
If, after careful consideration of ail the
evidence in this case, you are not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty.
If, on the other hand, you are convinced of the truth of
each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty
of the offense of theft by receiving stolen property based
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